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Introduction
The safety and survival of the crewmembers has been the
prime concern of NASA. Previous studies have been conducted
mainly for emergencies occurring during the operating mode of
the fully assembled Station. The present study was conducted
to evaluate the emergency requirements for the caution and
warning, logistics, maintenance, and assembly stage MB-6 of
the Station in space. Effective caution and warning is
essential to achieve safe egress in emergencies. In order
to survive a long period in space, the safety and emergency
requirements for maintenance, logistics, and extravehicular
assembly operation in space must be met.
Objectives
The objective of the study was to have an independent
evaluation of the safety and emergency egress requirements for
caution and warning, logistics, maintenance, and assembly of
the Station in space.
Emergency Egress
Emergency egress is defined as the egress from a
pressurized element when an event makes the element
uninhabitable and ingress into a contiguous pressurized
element that is safe.
Caution and Warning Methods
The Data Management System of the Station will provide
the caution and warning signals, while _MAD will provide an
additional warning for emergency situations. At present,
EMAD has limited independent sensors for detecting emergency
situations. It is recommended that the sensors located
throughout the Station for detecting emergency situations
should also be connected to EMAD to improve the effectiveness
of the EMAD system. A suggested location for the work
stations is the midsection of the modules. According to the
current plan, there is no EMAD panel in logistics modules.
A drag on EMAD panel is recommended for logistics modules to
supplement the auditory alarm in an emergency.
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A graphical cum alphanumerical format is recommended
for displaying emergency action information (figure i) at
the Multipurpose Application Consoles. The detailed
specifications of the graphical model, consistent with
the human factors requirements have to be developed.
The emergency action depends on the location of the crew
members for a particular accident; as such, the action
message should be appropriate at each work station for a
particular emergency.
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FIGURE 1
Operation of Mini/Pressurized Loqistics Modules (MPLM/PLM)
The function of logistics modules is to support cargo
transportation in racks from the US LAB, JEM, Columbus
modules, and nodes to PLM and vice versa. The major tasks for
logistics operation consist of handling racks to and from
MPLM/PLM units. The average time required for handling a rack
is estimated to be about 30 minutes. Based on the Neutral
Buoyancy Simulation conducted recently (i), it is suggested
that two persons are required to safely handle a rack as shown
in figure 2.
HANDLING A RACK
Q
FIGURE - 2
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One person as the front and a second person at-the rear
should hold a rack handgrip by one hand and use the other hand
for translation guidance (figure 2). Recessed handgrips
located centrally at the front and rear of a rack are
recommended for translation purposes. Special care should be
exercised while crossing hatch openings as the clearance
between a moving rack and a hatch opening is very limited as
shown in figure 2. In addition, the speed of translation
during rack handling should not exceed 1 foot/second to allow
frequent stops required to achieve a controlled movement and
avoid accidents.
In an emergency during logistics operation, crew members
present in MPLM/PLM should egress to the attached node.
There is a probability of a catastrophe in case of a large
fire occurring in the attached node (3). A contingency drag
on oxygen supply is recommended for the waiting period of
trapped crewmembers in this situation.
Maintenance Mode of Major Equipment
A typical Intravehicular Activity (IVA) for maintenance
consists of shutdown, safing, gain access, replace or repair,
close access, and testing of Orbital Replaceable Units or
Orbital Maintainable Items, done sequentially by one
person (2). A total of 640 IVA preventive and corrective
maintenance tasks were identified. It is estimated that a
total of 360 manhours/year will be required to cover all these
tasks. During 50 percent of maintenance duration, one or more
racks will be tilted on the aisle for access, causing partial
blockage of the egress path. Typically, a tilted rack will
be flat on an aisle and will reduce the egress path from
80 inches x 80 inches to 80 inches x 40.3 inches, as shown
in figure 3. However, the reduced opening is adequate for
emergency egress inside a module as illustrated in figure 6.
Although the egress path is blocked during hatch
maintenance, the probability of an emergency during hatch
maintenance is extremely low. A rigorous preventive
maintenance is recommended to minimize the breakdown of
hatch mechanism.
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Safety and Emergency Egress During Assembly Phase MB-6
A total of 17 stages have been planned for assembling
the Station in space. From MB-6, the Station will be occupied
by humans at least for short periods. As such, safety and
emergency provisions are required beginning this assembly
stage.
Most of the assembly operations consist of hazardous
Extravehicular Activities (EVA). A catastrophic emergency may
arise due to puncture of an EVA suit (4). It is recommended
that all sharp edges must be rounded or capped. In case of
any emergency situation during this assembly operation, the
crewmembers should translate to the docked Orbiter and de-
orbit. For safe assembly operation, handholds and attachments
are required on all modules and nodes. All EVA tools should
also be tethered. A safe EVA operation procedure should be
developed and used for training of EVA crewmembers.
During an emergency at MB-6, the worst emergency scenario
consists of an accident at Node 2 and all four crewmembers
located in the lab cannot translate through the damaged Node 2
to the Orbiter. In this case, crewmembers should close the
lab hatch, isolate the lab, and wait for rescue by Orbiter.
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